jimdavis wrote: ↑
Tue Aug 14, 2018 9:20 am
Bront wrote: ↑
Tue Aug 14, 2018 9:04 am
...and then to have dawdled around flying a large circuit with a burning engine, without an attempt to fight the fire or shut down the engine or to get back on the ground asap is just criminal to me.
So tell us, Bront, do you have some inside information about what was going on in that cockpit? Do you think those guys either didn't know what they were doing - or were just enjoying the ride while the aircraft was burning around them? And if the burning engine was still delivering power - would you have shut it down? Tell us how you would have handled the situation and saved the day?
There are two things going on here:
1. Should they have taken off? If the info we have so far is correct - then the answer wold be a pretty emphatic NO.
2. Having got into the air - is any one of us in a position to criticise the actions and decisions of the crew?
Oops! Double transmission with JK
Jim and JK, you are overly harsh on blokes like Bront.
In his way, he was raising a very valid point - why did the crew not fight the fire? The actions required to be performed in the event of an engine fire are clearly stated in the AFM. There are no options like "If required for terrain clearance, fighting the fire may be delayed by 5 minutes". So, Jim, to answer your question: "is any one of us in a position to criticize the actions and decisions of the crew?", yes, I am, and Bront has done so too. The should have, were required to, fight the fire as per the AFM procedures. No point in beating about the bush, that is what they were required to do. They second-guessed the manufacturer's instructions for whatever reason. The manufacturer most likely knows the possible effects of an engine fire on other systems, in this case possible the aileron controls and the feathering system. And before you again get defensive of the crew, remember that they had, prior to flight, made a number of unforgivable decisions, effectively forfeiting any "benefit of the doubt" considerations regarding their in-flight decisions.
Having got that out of the way, one can speculate about why they did not carry out the fire drill once airborne:
Perhaps, despite the information apparently conveyed to them by the LAME's assistant, they did not accept that the engine was on fire. Was the fire detection system inoperative? Was it checked before flight? Why did the crew not question the assistant? If the detection system was unserviceable, why did they commit to take-off? If they did this, it is unforgivable. If it was showing a fire and they ignored it, that is unforgivable.
Why did they not feather the engine and fight the fire? Perhaps they knew that flight was not sustainable on a single engine? This they should have known prior to take-off, and should have made plans to land straight ahead for example. If the two preceding statements are correct, why did they try to complete a circuit with a burning engine instead of landing ahead? The answers to these do not show up the crew in a good light at all.
So, Jim and JK, don't belittle blokes like Bront, by asking him what he would have done to save the day. Give him the benefit of your vast experience and tell him what you would have done. The crew have already, by Jim's admission implicated themselves by their poor decisions prior to take-off, so there is no need to protect them. This is a learning forum. Tell us what would have led you to delay fighting the engine fire, tell us about what we should be thinking of landing options with marginal single engine performance, tell us about the need for proper planning, crew coordination and so on....