American CRJ and army Black Hawk Mid air - Washington

[cage]

I believe the chopper PIC had under 500hrs flight time. In the civilian world this type of plane requires an ALTP. (ATPL H) . This is the weakest link

She had around 450 hours of flight time, but had an experienced instructor in the other seat which only makes it stranger that such a deviation wouldn't be corrected.
They are all volunteer pilots.
Stats for military accidents have been creeping up, so something isn't working well.

[Snitch]

I believe the chopper PIC had under 500hrs flight time. In the civilian world this type of plane requires an ALTP. (ATPL H) . This is the weakest link

US training orginisations only requires Commercial with Instrument.
Some require 500 turbine hours aswell
Some private owners are said to have PPL's or very fresh Coms

https://www.lockheedmartin.com/content/ ... ptions.pdf

[Wilco-LA]

To be PIC (PC in the Army), I believe one needs a minimum of 400 or 450 hours to track PC assuming they pass all checks. She was an officer, an 03 - a captain. She was being recertified as she hadn’t flown for a couple of years. The IP was a warrant officer with about 1,000 hrs total time.

Army helicopter pilots come out of Fort Rucker (Novosel), Alabama with about 150 hour or so of flight time. Annual Army flight hour minima for Blackhawk pilots is 96 hours a year of which 24 can be in a simulator. If a sim is used to reach annual minima, actual minimum stick time is 72 hours per year or 6 hours per month. This is barely enough to keep a weekend warrior safe and current let alone a military aviator flying a multi million dollar helicopter.

The number of flight hours has decreased across the board for all US military branches (Army, Navy, USAF, Marines, and Coast Guard - actually the USCG is under DHS) . Army Aviation has been affected more-so than the other services. GWOT has been winding down and there are fewer sorties/flight hours that come along with that. Also, a lot of experienced Army helicopter pilots have left the service in the last few years to jump on this unbelievable and unprecedented hiring wave we’ve had.

In the past, quite a few Army aviators would stick around for 20 years to qualify for a pension. Recently, many decided to get out much earlier, get their fixed wing ATP (paid for using the GI bill), fly an RJ for a regional for a year, and then get picked up by a legacy and make $250k/year as a 3rd year FO, rather than deal with Army BS for a third of the pay.

[Darren Hill]

I hope that this may be useful to some and shed light on what the controller was doing/seeing:

First thing to note is that "local" controllers (the American term for a Tower controller) is primarily a visual position. Their main focus shifts from looking outside (seeing visually if aircraft have vacated, when the runway is clear after a departure, etc) to looking at their (digital) strip board. As mentioned in this Blancolirio video:

there is usually an assistant, who was present during this accident. They play a key admin and coordination role, while also acting as a 2nd pair of eyes present in the Tower.

A common misconception that seems to be present in this thread is that the controller was "hopping between frequencies". Long gone are the days where this is needed. Most Towers (even FAWB!) have a digital voice communication control system (VCCS), which is a touch screen that allows controllers to change the frequency they use on-the-fly. One of the cool features of this is being able to listen and/or transmit on multiple frequencies (for the pilots reading, think of your audio panel). Another is being able to "cross-couple" frequencies - ie use the Tower's radio setup as a relay to have 2 frequencies act as 1 for anyone within radio range. Pretty nifty, ey? Coming back to my original point, the fact that the Tower was transmitting on 2 separate frequencies does not mean that he was "swapping" between the 2. Likely, he was listening and transmitting on both, but not cross-coupled (as the CRJ couldn't hear PAT's replies). I've heard of controllers handling this in different ways, such as one ear being on freq. Don't get me wrong, this is still stressful, but this is a fairly routine procedure across the ATC world.

Secondly, the talk of the controller "doing nothing" about his radar display. Below I've attached a screenshot from the VATSIM client CRC, which I've setup in STARS mode with DCA on a northerly flow. I have also enabled the coastline, which is optional but provides a lot of context to the point I want to make. Other optional (but disabled) views include showing the heli routes, RNAV approaches, etc

Screenshot 2025-02-04 082609.png

I've centered the view on KDCA, indicated by the red arrow. The coastline is shown in gray. I've circled an aircraft in blue, with an uncorrelated tag (ie it only shows the squawk, altitude, and speed). The range rings centered around DCA are in 5nm increments. I'd estimate that this is a relatively accurate "zoom" level, as it allows the Tower controller to see aircraft starting their approach.

Notice how the radar blip/primary return is visually not much bigger than the river itself? Now imagine 2 targets on either side of the river. I'd strongly suggest that it would be nearly impossible for a controller who only glances at this display as part of their workflow to notice 2 contacts being a few pixels too close. I'm also fairly sure that the red "CA" that appears above the tag would trigger for routine crossings, as they are designed to occur at less-than-required radar separation. As such, I don't think this crossing would've visually appeared much different, except if the controller was literally staring at this screen.

I'll also add this:
PAT25 requested visual separation and the controller approved it. The controller did not instruct PAT25 to maintain visual separation. That is a HUGE distinction to make here. As soon as this request is made, it is the pilot's responsibility to maintain separation. The fact that the helicopter was between 0.3-0.5nm off the intended route and ~100ft to high is simply not the controller's problem. He has to trust that the pilot has the traffic in sight! When I heard his 2nd call to confirm that PAT25 has the CRJ, I interpreted it as him seeing that this may be closer than usual and wanting to make dead sure on this visual separation thing. Unfortunately, that trust was let down by PAT25.

If anyone wants to shift blame to the controller in this accident, you've gotta make sure you have concrete evidence that he could've done more. I'm not so convinced...

[krobarza]

200ft is really very low for a published route.

That low, some city lights will be higher than you, which could mean it'll be tough picking up other aircraft on descent.

[cage]

200ft is really very low for a published route.

That low, some city lights will be higher than you, which could mean it'll be tough picking up other aircraft on descent.

Not for helicopter traffic transiting a busy airspace. And above a fairly wide river at that.

[ACE MAN]

I hope that this may be useful to some and shed light on what the controller was doing/seeing:

First thing to note is that "local" controllers (the American term for a Tower controller) is primarily a visual position. Their main focus shifts from looking outside (seeing visually if aircraft have vacated, when the runway is clear after a departure, etc) to looking at their (digital) strip board. As mentioned in this Blancolirio video:

there is usually an assistant, who was present during this accident. They play a key admin and coordination role, while also acting as a 2nd pair of eyes present in the Tower.

A common misconception that seems to be present in this thread is that the controller was "hopping between frequencies". Long gone are the days where this is needed. Most Towers (even FAWB!) have a digital voice communication control system (VCCS), which is a touch screen that allows controllers to change the frequency they use on-the-fly. One of the cool features of this is being able to listen and/or transmit on multiple frequencies (for the pilots reading, think of your audio panel). Another is being able to "cross-couple" frequencies - ie use the Tower's radio setup as a relay to have 2 frequencies act as 1 for anyone within radio range. Pretty nifty, ey? Coming back to my original point, the fact that the Tower was transmitting on 2 separate frequencies does not mean that he was "swapping" between the 2. Likely, he was listening and transmitting on both, but not cross-coupled (as the CRJ couldn't hear PAT's replies). I've heard of controllers handling this in different ways, such as one ear being on freq. Don't get me wrong, this is still stressful, but this is a fairly routine procedure across the ATC world.

Secondly, the talk of the controller "doing nothing" about his radar display. Below I've attached a screenshot from the VATSIM client CRC, which I've setup in STARS mode with DCA on a northerly flow. I have also enabled the coastline, which is optional but provides a lot of context to the point I want to make. Other optional (but disabled) views include showing the heli routes, RNAV approaches, etc
Screenshot 2025-02-04 082609.png
I've centered the view on KDCA, indicated by the red arrow. The coastline is shown in gray. I've circled an aircraft in blue, with an uncorrelated tag (ie it only shows the squawk, altitude, and speed). The range rings centered around DCA are in 5nm increments. I'd estimate that this is a relatively accurate "zoom" level, as it allows the Tower controller to see aircraft starting their approach.

Notice how the radar blip/primary return is visually not much bigger than the river itself? Now imagine 2 targets on either side of the river. I'd strongly suggest that it would be nearly impossible for a controller who only glances at this display as part of their workflow to notice 2 contacts being a few pixels too close. I'm also fairly sure that the red "CA" that appears above the tag would trigger for routine crossings, as they are designed to occur at less-than-required radar separation. As such, I don't think this crossing would've visually appeared much different, except if the controller was literally staring at this screen.

I'll also add this:
PAT25 requested visual separation and the controller approved it. The controller did not instruct PAT25 to maintain visual separation. That is a HUGE distinction to make here. As soon as this request is made, it is the pilot's responsibility to maintain separation. The fact that the helicopter was between 0.3-0.5nm off the intended route and ~100ft to high is simply not the controller's problem. He has to trust that the pilot has the traffic in sight! When I heard his 2nd call to confirm that PAT25 has the CRJ, I interpreted it as him seeing that this may be closer than usual and wanting to make dead sure on this visual separation thing. Unfortunately, that trust was let down by PAT25.

If anyone wants to shift blame to the controller in this accident, you've gotta make sure you have concrete evidence that he could've done more. I'm not so convinced...

Well summarised, the local (twr) ctlr is basically an ‘eyeball Mk2’ ctlr and does not provide a radar control service (more like using the radar for advisory service) . The fact that the radar is there is merely as a twr aid and to enhance awareness and associated warnings the system may give.

PS , I am not a fan of ‘band boxing’ unless both pilots on different frequencies can hear each other as well - I have used this in the past in the Middle East - our own JNB info (119.5 and 127.4) is a classic example where we have one information service provider transmitting on two frequencies but the pilots only hear the other pilots on their own frequency, which is why it is such a sh ! t show.

[Jabbanaught]

[dollar]

As more becomes known and you apply the BS filter you start to get a feel for how this happened? Anyone else get this inkling? Multiple layers of cheese. Some old and smelly, some on the night. Fresh. My understanding is that there are a host of contributors and I would most certainly hesitate to apportion degrees of blame

I would however exclude the CRJ crew. Everyone else is fair game. Those who wish to pin it on the ATC are getting way ahead of themselves. The heli was high and off course but we don't know why. The route was a particularly bad idea - most may agree. And this contributed to the first couple of layers of old smelly cheese. Add two or three new slices and the result is in the river. ...

[Wilco-LA]

As more becomes known and you apply the BS filter you start to get a feel for how this happened? Anyone else get this inkling? Multiple layers of cheese. Some old and smelly, some on the night. Fresh. My understanding is that there are a host of contributors and I would most certainly hesitate to apportion degrees of blame

I would however exclude the CRJ crew. Everyone else is fair game. Those who wish to pin it on the ATC are getting way ahead of themselves. The heli was high and off course but we don't know why. The route was a particularly bad idea - most may agree. And this contributed to the first couple of layers of old smelly cheese. Add two or three new slices and the result is in the river. ...

The Priority Air Transport (PAT) Blackhawk flight was conducting an annual recertification flight for the PC. The squadron is based out of Ft. Belvoir at the Davison Army Airfield. The helicopter routes in the area are standard and charted. Really a nothing burger when it comes to the route chosen for this flight. Each segment has a maximum authorized altitude. In this case, for Route 4, north of the Wilson Bridge, it is 200 feet.

I believe the Blackhawk was from a squadron that trains for continuity of government flights. Continuity of government is the plan in place which keeps the US government up and running in case of a major attack on Washington, D.C. Helicopters out of Ft. Belvoir are used for the evacuation and relocation of top congressional leaders and other high ranking government officials.

These sorties are practiced frequently with crews flying the same routes as PAT25 did. These sorties are a small part of the helicopter traffic (both civilian, military, law enforcement) which safely traverses D.C. airspace using these same routes.

Why was the Blackhawk 100 to 150 feet or so above the max altitude is the question? IP not paying attention? The PIC struggling to maintain altitude? Incorrect altimeter setting? Lack of SA? Lack of communication and CRM? Thought the max altitude for,that segment was 300 feet and not 200? Were NVGs involved as part of the recertification process resulting in a distraction? IDK, but I am sure we will find out.

Had the Blackhawk crew adhered to the altitude restrictions, this thread never would have started. The route chosen was not a "particularly bad idea". Not singling you out dollar; just paraphrasing..

That route is part of day to day helicopter operations in the D.C. area. Nothing inherently unsafe about that route IF all altitude restrictions are complied with.

[jimdavis]

The choppers could have practiced flying these routes after midnight when the civvi traffic is pretty much non-existent.

I suspect that will be the first thing they will change.

jim

[dollar]

As more becomes known and you apply the BS filter you start to get a feel for how this happened? Anyone else get this inkling? Multiple layers of cheese. Some old and smelly, some on the night. Fresh. My understanding is that there are a host of contributors and I would most certainly hesitate to apportion degrees of blame

I would however exclude the CRJ crew. Everyone else is fair game. Those who wish to pin it on the ATC are getting way ahead of themselves. The heli was high and off course but we don't know why. The route was a particularly bad idea - most may agree. And this contributed to the first couple of layers of old smelly cheese. Add two or three new slices and the result is in the river. ...

The Priority Air Transport (PAT) Blackhawk flight was conducting an annual recertification flight for the PC. The squadron is based out of Ft. Belvoir at the Davison Army Airfield. The helicopter routes in the area are standard and charted. Really a nothing burger when it comes to the route chosen for this flight. Each segment has a maximum authorized altitude. In this case, for Route 4, north of the Wilson Bridge, it is 200 feet.

I believe the Blackhawk was from a squadron that trains for continuity of government flights. Continuity of government is the plan in place which keeps the US government up and running in case of a major attack on Washington, D.C. Helicopters out of Ft. Belvoir are used for the evacuation and relocation of top congressional leaders and other high ranking government officials.

These sorties are practiced frequently with crews flying the same routes as PAT25 did. These sorties are a small part of the helicopter traffic (both civilian, military, law enforcement) which safely traverses D.C. airspace using these same routes.

Why was the Blackhawk 100 to 150 feet or so above the max altitude is the question? IP not paying attention? The PIC struggling to maintain altitude? Incorrect altimeter setting? Lack of SA? Lack of communication and CRM? Thought the max altitude for,that segment was 300 feet and not 200? Were NVGs involved as part of the recertification process resulting in a distraction? IDK, but I am sure we will find out.

Had the Blackhawk crew adhered to the altitude restrictions, this thread never would have started. The route chosen was not a "particularly bad idea". Not singling you out dollar; just paraphrasing..

That route is part of day to day helicopter operations in the D.C. area. Nothing inherently unsafe about that route IF all altitude restrictions are complied with.

Thanks for the comprehensive response. My opinion concerning the routing remains however. The fact that they have been doing it for years steadily increases the likelihood of there being a mid air eventually. There is no room for error. Everything looks ops normal until it isn't. A series of minor deviations is all it takes. How fast can a Blackhawk gain 100ft? How accurate is the altimeter/s at such low altitudes?

[Christopher]

<Thought the max altitude for that segment was 300 feet>

Just think of what you have written there: <common sense> should tell you that 300' right under the final approach to Rwy33 is almost suicidal! Finish en klaar!

[richard C]

<Thought the max altitude for that segment was 300 feet>

Just think of what you have written there: <common sense> should tell you that 300' right under the final approach to Rwy33 is almost suicidal! Finish en klaar!

Since there is a steady flow of airlines turning onto a short final directly over your head - just take a moment to calculate what the resultant separation actually works out to be.

Insanity.

[cage]

Looking at playbacks from around the time of this accident, they appear to have 3 or more movements per minute.
That is a lot for 1 person to manage.